Where should textual criticism be discussed in systematic theology?

This is a question I have been pondering since giving my paper at ETS this year on textual criticism in the Reformation. Note carefully that the question is not how or if to discuss textual criticism, but where. (For more on how, see here.)

Source

The obvious answer, of course, is under the heading of bibliology. But where within that? Most modern theologies—certainly evangelical ones—discuss textual criticism under the subtopic of inerrancy. It makes sense given that textual criticism deals with errors and so does inerrancy. (For more on that below)

But this has not always been the place where textual criticism is treated. In my reading of Reformation writers, textual criticism is almost always addressed under the heading of authenticity. There are good historical reasons for this that were the subject of my paper but they are not my focus here. What interests me here is the other place I found textual criticism discussed and that is under the topic of the clarity of Scripture. Let me give some examples.

Ussher (1581-1656)

James Ussher in his Explication of the Body of Christian Religion, written in Q&A format, starts with a large section on Scripture or the “grounds of the Christian religion.” After discussing things like inspiration and canonicity he moves to objections. Textual criticism is discussed under objections, not to inspiration or infallibility, but perspicuity. The broader question is, “Are the Scriptures then plain and easy to be understood?” (p. 18). The specific question that leads directly to textual criticism is this:

How can the certain understanding of the Scriptures be taken out of the Original Tongues, considering the difference of Reading, which is in diverse Copies both of Hebrew and Greek; as also the difficulty of some Words and Phrases upon which the best Translators cannot agree?

I’ve discussed his answer before on the blog here. What I want to draw attention to here is the question itself where What about difficult word meanings? is treated right along with What about textual variants? For Ussher, both present problems for perspicuity. His answer, in part, is that not all the Scriptures are equally clear in themselves or to all readers. Just before this, Ussher had given no less than six reasons why God leaves some places in Scripture “obscure.” But my point here is to draw attention to the fact that Ussher puts uncertainties resulting from textual variation in the same category as uncertainties from interpretation.

Baxter (1615-1691)

Writing a little later, Richard Baxter does the same. In discussing the “many parts” of the Scriptures that have uncertainty, his first example comes from the fact that “many hundred texts are uncertain, through various readings in several copies of the original.” (By original, he means original language.) And what does Baxter discuss in the next paragraph? “Many hundred words in the Scripture that are ambiguous, signifying more things than one.” So, again, we have text-critical uncertainty dealt with in the same context as lexical or interpretive uncertainty. (For more on Baxter and textual criticism, see here.)

KJV Preface (1611)

One final and perhaps unexpected place one finds these two types of uncertainty combined is in the preface the King James Bible. Among the things Miles Smith needed to accomplish in the preface was to defend its use of marginal notes. The problem with notes is that they showed the reader where the meaning was uncertain and that might seem to undermine the Bible’s authority. But such uncertainty has a theological justification in that “it hath pleased God in his divine providence, here and there to scatter words and sentences of that difficulty and doubtfulness, not in doctrinal points that concern salvation ... but in matters of less moment” (source). 

It’s in this context that Smith mentions how Pope Sixtus V expressly forbid “that any variety of readings of their Vulgar edition should be put in the margin; (which though it be not altogether the same thing to that we have in hand, yet it looketh that way;) but we think he hath not all of his own side his favors for this conceit.” It’s that parenthetical remark (emphasis mine) that shows that Smith draws only a slight distinction between textual and lexical ambiguity. The KJV marginal notes themselves do even less to distinguish them. (For more on that, see my chapter here.) Again, then, we see textual uncertainty treated in the same category as semantic ambiguity.

So what?

Having surveyed these three examples, let’s tweak our initial question by asking instead What benefits might we gain by a return to this older way of treating textual criticism? Instead of treating it as a problem for inerrancy or inspiration, what if we treated it as a problem for the clarity of Scripture? Here are some initial thoughts:

1. It avoids the problem of conflating textual errors with theological ones. As noted above, one reason people naturally put textual criticism together with inerrancy is that both trade in the language of “error.” The problem is that most scribal errors do not produce a text that is in theological or historical error. If we discussed textual criticism as a problem for the clarity of Scripture, this would probably be more obvious to people. Textual variants do affect the meaning of Scripture even if the meaning they affect is not a matter of larger theological consequence.
2. It makes the problem ours rather than God’s. What I mean here is that treating textual criticism in relation to the clarity of Scripture connects the issue to hermeneutics (our role) more than inspiration (God’s role). This follows from the previous point. We have to decide if Goliath is either four or six cubits, and that has some affect on our interpretation of the narrative. But that is just one among several interpretive questions that affect our reading of the story. We can still understand the story, still appreciate it, still apply it even when we have unanswered questions leftover. Just as we can all live with uncertainty in interpretation, so we can live with uncertainty in textual criticism. Hence the final point:
3. It reminds us that the clarity of Scripture has never required absolute certainty or total clarity. If you read the full context from the three examples I gave above, you will see that they all go into detail about how not everything in Scripture is equally plain to every reader at all times and in all places. One thing that still surprises me in reading the Reformers is just how readily they admit that there are “dark” or uncertain places in the Bible. They never hide from this. And yet, they were equally clear that the existence of such dark places doesn’t require a magisterium because it doesn’t nullify the Bible’s magisterial authority. If that’s true in interpretation, surely it’s true in textual criticism too.

Objections?

If these are some benefits, are there any drawbacks to treating textual and interpretive uncertainty together? Here’s two I can think of:

1. It obscures the knock-on effect of textual uncertainty. Someone might object that, since interpretation depends on textual decisions, uncertainty about the text has greater ramifications than uncertainties of interpretation. Treating them together obscures this. Perhaps, but I would venture that uncertainties of interpretation (and translation with them) are far more common and typically more serious than textual ones. The places where commentators disagree about the meaning has to be far greater than where they disagree about the original text. That seems true across time—it’s not just a function of our modern manuscript discoveries. Interpretive disagreements have always outweighed and outnumbered textual ones. Whatever uncertainties we can tolerate when it comes to interpretation have to be more than enough to encompass the textual uncertainties.
2. Because inerrancy is tied to the autographs we should treat textual criticism in relation to inerrancy. I’m sensitive to this one since this is usually how textual criticism comes up in theological contexts. When an evangelical student learns about textual criticism, his next question is never “But what about perspicuity?” It’s usually “What about inerrancy?” But, while this is the case, should it be? Must it be? Maybe we wouldn’t field so many concerned theological questions if we were in the habit of treating textual criticism as a question for the clarity of Scripture. We could still talk about the distinction between the autographs and the copies, but that distinction itself might not need to bear so much weight (see point one above under So what?).

Well, these are my initial thoughts and I’d be very happy to hear yours.